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A CLIENTS' THEORY OF PROFESSIONALISM
Leslie Griffin *
In this Article I identify some elements of a clients' theory of
professionalism. My starting point is the most common complaint of clients
about lawyers: they neglect the matters entrusted to them. In Part I, 1 identify
the standard, lawyers' account of professionalism, with its two principles of
partisanship and nonaccountability. In Part II, I select the two principles that
many clients would prefer, namely competence and diligence. Lawyers have
made at least three attempts to codify these clients' principles. Part II.A
examines their treatment in Canons 6 and 7 of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. Part II.B reviews Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1
and 1.3. Part II.C analyzes the distinctive Texas Rule of Professional Conduct
1.01, which combines competence and diligence into one standard. Because
the Texas disciplinary rule adopts a standard that is more than negligent but
less than intentional conduct, in Part III, I analyze the difference between
negligence and neglect. In Part IV, I suggest that clients would prefer a
disciplinary system based on strict liability for neglect.
I. PARTISANSHIP AND NONACCOUNTABILITY
The standard account of legal ethics, developed primarily from the
experience of lawyers and debated principally by law professors, emphasizes
two principles: partisanship and moral nonaccountability, which comprise the
"standard" or "dominant" conception of the lawyer's role.' Partisanship "holds
that lawyers should undertake all lawful actions that best serve their clients'
interests, even if those actions are antithetical to the interests of justice or
morality in particular cases."2 Hence, partisan lawyers are zealous advocates
who do all they can to serve their clients' interests; they "follow their clients'
wishes."3 Nonaccountability means that "lawyers are not morally responsible
* Larry & Joanne Doherty Chair in Legal Ethics, University of Houston Law Center. Ph.D., Yale; J.D.,
Stanford Law School. Thanks to Anita Bernstein for organizing this Symposium and to Carla Bey, Lorely
Ramirez, Harriet Richman, and Michelle Wu for excellent research assistance.
1 See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 50-55, 154-57 (1988); Andrew M.
Perlman, A Career Choice Critique of Legal Ethics Theory, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 829,845 (2001).
2 Perlman, supra note 1, at 846.
3 Id. at 848.
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for the clients they represent or for the lawful means they employ to
accomplish their clients' objectives. 4  Hence, lawyers deserve no moral
opprobrium when they represent the guiltiest criminal defendants accused of
the grimmest crimes. The client's immorality or guilt is not imputed to the
morally nonaccountable lawyer. Recently "neutral partisanship" has become
the favored expression that summarizes these two principles and the standard
account.
Neutral partisanship is ostensibly based on the profession's concern about
clients and thus provides a suitable starting point for this Symposium on
clients' wants. Indeed, classic essays in legal ethics state that these two
• • ,,6
principles "described the essence of client-centered lawyering. Con-
temporary commentators agree that the two principles are foundational because
they protect clients' autonomy.7  Another well-known article, moreover,
argued that the lawyer's amoral role can be justified because that role assists
clients to exercise their autonomy. Indeed, by now the standard criticism of
this standard conception is that it is too client-centered because it neglects
other concerns about, for example, common morality, social values, or the
public interest.8 Some critics insist that morality-centered legal ethics should
• 9
replace client-centered ones.
A different criticism comes from those who argue, relying on empirical
data, that real lawyers do not act according to the ideal of neutral partisanship.
Instead, "the problem with the way lawyers conceive of their role is the
opposite of neutral partisanship; lawyers are not sufficiently zealous in
representing their clients because they are concerned about protecting their
reputations, preserving relationships with other lawyers, judges, or officials, or
advancing their own interests."'0 Perhaps lawyers are not so client-centered
after all. Disciplinary data about lawyers' neglect support this observation that
lawyers are not always zealous. Across states, jurisdictions, and decades, the
4 id. at 850.
5 See Nathan Crystal, Developing A Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 75, 86 (2000) (citing Murray Schwartz) ("Following Simon, many writers now use the term 'Neutral
Partisanship' to refer to the standard conception of the lawyer's role.").
6 Id. at 86 (citing Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 669 (1978); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543).
7 Perlman, supra note 1, at 851.
8 See Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 9 (1995).
9 See David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873 (1999) (identifying
morality-centered and law-centered approaches to legal ethics).
10 Crystal, supra note 5, at 88.
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leading complaint against lawyers remains that they neglect their clients'
matters." Hence, clients too may be skeptical of the standard account and
prefer a legal ethic that addresses their primary complaint: neglect.
In a simple and elegant book entitled Lying, Sissela Bok argued that too
frequently the lie is examined from the perspective of the liar rather than that
• 12
of the deceived. In the same way, lawyers may view neglect from their own
perspective and ignore the viewpoint of the client. In this Symposium we
examined what legal professionalism looks like from the perspective of the
neglected. From their viewpoint, the most important professional principles
are competence and diligence. Being prepared and punctual is so
commonsensical and unobjectionable that these rules are not as interesting
theoretically as partisanship and nonaccountability. Nor do they pose as many
difficult ethical dilemmas. This suggests that a clients' theory of
professionalism would begin with discipline rather than theory.
II. COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Lawyers have developed at least three ethical and disciplinary versions of
competence and diligence: the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct.
A. Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (the Code) was drafted in 1969 and, at that time, was adopted in
many states, including Texas. The Code's structure includes canons (which
state the broad principles governing lawyers' conduct), ethical considerations
11 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3) n.5 (1980) (citing Annual Report of
City of New York for 1967-1968 where "more than half of all such offenses ... involved neglect"); State Bar
of Texas Attorney Grievance System (chart on file with author) (showing that out of 32,958 rules violations
alleged from 1994-2002, 17,971, or 53%, involved neglect); Justice Edward Kinkeade, The Top Ten Reasons
Clients File Grievances Against Their Lawyers, 5 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 35, 36 (1998) ("[Neglect] is the
most common cause for grievances filed on lawyers."); see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM
HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 6-13 to 6-14 (2003), which notes:
Interestingly, a footnote to DR 6-101(A)(3) stated that in 1968 in New York City, over half of the
complaints against lawyers that involved offenses against clients were for neglect. More recent
but remarkably similar statistics may be obtained from virtually every state disciplinary authority,
as well as the American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility.
12 See generally SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 20-23 (1999).
2003]
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(which affirm the highest standards toward which lawyers aspire), and
disciplinary rules (which identify norms whose violation subjects lawyers to
censure, reprimand, suspension, or disbarment). On the subject of neglect, the
most important Canons are 6 and 7.I3 Canon 6 states that a "lawyer should
represent a client competently"; Canon 7 states that "a lawyer should represent
a client zealously within the bounds of the law.' 4 Because Canon 7 focuses
primarily on issues of zealousness, nonaccountability, and partisanship, I
concentrate on Canon 6.
Under Canon 6, a lawyer must possess or acquire sufficient learning to
master her cases and keep up with new developments in the law. Ethical
Consideration 6-4 states that a lawyer should "prepare adequately for and give
appropriate attention to his legal work."' 5 Ethical Consideration 6-5 identifies
positive reasons for lawyers to avoid neglect: "A lawyer should have pride in
his professional endeavors. His obligation to act competently calls for higher
motivation than that arising from fear of civil liability or disciplinary penalty."
The disciplinary rule connected with Canon 6 and these aspirational Canons
and ethical ideals is more pragmatic. It states, quite simply: "A lawyer shall
not: Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."'
6
Such a straightforward disciplinary rule would seem appealing to clients
and easy to administer. An early ABA informal opinion, however, anticipated
that the application of the rule could become complex. The questions
presented to the ethics panel represent typical instances of client neglect,
including delay, missing the statute of limitations, and adequate preparation for
trial:
1. A lawyer is retained to seek redress for losses sustained by
his client. A year elapses and his file reveals that he has
taken little, if any, affirmative action in the matter. Has the
lawyer violated DR 6-101 ?
13 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1980); id. Canon 7.
14 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS-THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 2002-2003, at 69 ("DR 7-101 (A)(I) provided that a lawyer 'shall not intentionally ... fail to
seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the
Disciplinary Rules .... '). DR 7-101(A)(3) provided that a lawyer "shall not intentionally ... [pirejudice or
damage his client during the course of the relationship ...." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
101 (A)(3).
15 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-4.
16 Id. DR6-101(A)(3).
[Vol. 52
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2. Assume the lawyer engaged in necessary investigation and
adequately prepares the claim, but he fails to file a suit
within the applicable statute of limitations. Has the lawyer
violated DR 6-101? Is it relevant whether the omission by
the lawyer was inadvertent?
3. Assume a lawyer has not neglected the matter entrusted to
him, is his ordinary negligence involving an affirmative act
or omission grounds for disciplinary action?
4. Assume the lawyer for the plaintiff does in fact file the suit
but not within the applicable statute of limitations. Defense
counsel, however, fails to plead the affirmative defense of
the statute of limitations, and the suit goes to trial. Has
defense counsel violated DR 6-101 ?
5. A lawyer, a member of the bar for two years, is retained to
defend a client charged with a criminal offense for which
the maximum sentence that could be imposed is twenty
years. The lawyer has some limited experience in minor
criminal matters but has not previously handled a case of
equivalent seriousness. The lawyer does not associate
himself with experienced counsel and represents the
defendant at trial. Has the lawyer violated DR 6-101? "
Despite the simple scenarios of the questions, the ABA refused to address
questions 1, 2, 4, and 5 "because each of the four fact situations could be
supplemented by additional facts, not inconsistent with the facts given ... from
which neglect might or might not be shown depending on all other relevant
factors."' 8 The opinion avoided analysis of the specific facts (of most concern
to clients) and focused on the harder analytical question 3 of the relationship
between neglect and negligence. From the bar's standpoint, the difficult
disciplinary issue ("an important question of broad import"' 9) was whether
ordinary negligence would constitute neglect.
This early ABA informal opinion rejected the idea that one act of ordinary
negligence (for which a lawyer could be liable in civil court) warrants
disciplinary sanction for neglect before state bar associations. It distinguished
neglect from negligence in the following definition:
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Neglect involves indifference and a consistent failure to carry out the
obligations which the lawyer has assumed to his client or a conscious
disregard for the responsibility owed to the client. The concept of
ordinary negligence is different. Neglect usually involves more than
a single act or omission. Neglect cannot be found if the acts or
omissions complained of were inadvertent or the result of an error of
judgment made in good faith. 2
Hence the straightforward: "A lawyer shall not: Neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him" was "soon ... limited to instances of 'indifference and ...
consistent failure' to attend to, or a 'conscious disregard' of, a client's
matter."2  Moreover, the wording "gave the impression that the rule was
concerned with... a pattern of neglect. For this reason, most cases imposing
discipline under Canon 6 involved conduct that was either outlandish or
prolonged, frequently coupled with other violations."22
Texas chose more limited language for its disciplinary rule when it adopted
Canon 6; it included a willful or intentional element. "A lawyer shall not:
Willfully or intentionally neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."23 "Thus,
only those lawyers shown to have deliberately chosen not to attend to a matter
could be disciplined for neglect., 24  As Professors Schuwerk and Sutton
20 Id. See also Leonard E. Gross, Contractual Limitations on Attorney Malpractice Liability: An
Economic Approach, 75 Ky. L.J. 793, 813 n.51 (1986) (quoting ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances,
Informal Op. 1273 (1973)); Robert P. Schuwerk & John F. Sutton, Jr., A Guide to the Texas Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct, 27A Hous. L. REV. I, 25 (1990) ("The ABA, however, soon interpreted the
proscription as limited to instances of 'indifference and ... consistent failure' to attend to, or a 'conscious
disregard' of, a client's matter." (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 n.l
(1974) (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1273 (1973)))).
"Neglect" is an important concept in the law of ethics: it means a pattern of action or
inaction, more than one instance of delay. Under the Model Code, a showing of neglect usually
required proof of a pattern of behavior. If a lawyer on one occasion forgot to file an answer to a
complaint in time because of inadvertence, he would be guilty of civil malpractice if the client
were damaged, but he would not be guilty of the ethical violation of neglect. "Neglect involves
indifference and a consistent failure to carry out the obligations which the lawyer has assumed to
the client or a conscious disregard for the responsibility owed to the client." Neglect requires a
pattern of omission.
ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 4-2, at 88-89.
21 Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 20, at 25 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 335 n.1 (1974) and quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof]I Responsibility, Informal Op. 1273
(1973)).
22 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 11, § 3-4.
23 TEXAS CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSlBiLrry DR 6-101(A)(3) (1988) (emphasis added); Schuwerk &
Sutton, Jr., supra note 20, at 18 ("DR 6-101(a)(3) did require that a lawyer's neglect of a matter be willful or
intentional before the lawyer could be subjected to discipline.").
24 Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 20, at 25.
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observed (after drafting their own Texas Rule 1.01 in 1990), the high standard
"allowed many instances of highly unprofessional conduct to go unpunished
altogether." 
25
B. Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983. The
provisions relevant to neglect were located in two new rules, 1.1 (Competence)
and 1.3 (Diligence). According to Model Rule 1.1, "[a] lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation."" The simple, straightforward rule of neglect was
abandoned. "Whereas DR 6-101(A)(3) prohibited the '[nieglect of a legal
matter,' Rule 1.1 does not contain such a prohibition. Instead, Rule 1.1
affirmatively requires the lawyer to be competent."27
The neglect provisions fit more naturally into the rule on diligence.
According to Model Rule 1.3, "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client., 28 As Professors Hazard and Hodes
explain in their commentary on Model Rule 1.3:
The (disciplinary) duty of reasonable diligence set forth in Model
Rule 1.3 is derived from aspects of Canons 6 and 7 of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 generally prohibited
failure to act "competently," and one of its disciplinary rules, DR 6-
O1(A)(3), mandated that a lawyer not "neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him." Canon 7 of the Code stated an obligation of
"zeal." Model Rule 1.3 clarifies and expands both these concepts.29
The sections of 1.3 that best address neglect appear in Comment [2], on the
evils of procrastination:
Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than
procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected
by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme
instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the
client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's
interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay
25 Id.
26 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.1 (1983).
27 Id. R. 1.1 (Model Code Comparison).
28 Id. R. 1.3.
29 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 11, at 6-3.
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can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in a
lawyer's trustworthiness. °
That last sentence has been important in the disciplinary setting. Lawyers can
be disciplined for neglect even though the client's case was not harmed by the
delay. As the Oregon Supreme Court stated in In re Gastineau, "If a lawyer
does a poor job, but the client fortuitously or through the efforts of others
obtains a good result, that does not excuse the lawyer from providing
competent representation or justify neglecting the case."'" Thus, in such
circumstances, it is possible to reprimand an attorney for delay even though her
client could not pursue a civil case. Moreover, in contrast to the interpretations
of the Code, the rule lacks any requirement that "a lawyer engage in a pattern
of misconduct before discipline may be imposed. 3 2 A single breach of duty to
one's client deserves discipline.33
Despite these features that make the new Model Rules more client-friendly
than the Code, the diligence rule remains difficult to enforce because it
provides "no absolute standard";34 it is fact-specific. The leading commentary
on the Rules remains lawyer-friendly when it concludes that "[a] lawyer is not
required to over-pursue or overstaff every case in order to demonstrate
diligence." 35
30 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 2. See also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 11, at 6-8
to 6-9 which states:
Improper procrastination is all too common a failing in the legal profession, often resulting
from a lawyer or law firm's taking on too much legal work. It is a special cause of resentment
against lawyers generally, and it is entirely inexcusable. Published statistics consistently indicate
that procrastination is one of the most common bases of complaints against lawyers. Even when
the consequences of delay are not as serious as missing a filing date that destroys a client's case,
delay causes resentment, anxiety, and loss of client confidence.
(emphasis added).
31 In re Gastineau, 857 P.2d 136, 142 (Or. 1993). See also Mendocino v. Magagna, 572 P.2d 21 (Wyo.
1977) (lawyer who neglected forty estates over twenty-four years could be disciplined for neglect even without
allegations that clients suffered a pecuniary loss).
32 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 11, at 6-10 (emphasis added).
33 Id.
31 Id. at 6-8.
31 Id. at 6-9.
[Vol. 52
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C. Texas
As noted above, Texas initially adopted a version of DR 6-101(A)(3) that
required willful or intentional conduct for a violation of the rule. In Brown v.
State Bar of Texas, the Texas Court of Appeals defined these terms as follows.
The violations of these two sections [6-101(A)(3) and 7-O1(A)(2)]
can only occur if there is something more than mere neglect or bad
judgment and the neglect must be willful or intentional. Willful
means something said or done deliberately or intentionally or
following one's own will unreasoningly; obstinate; stubborn ...
Intentional is defined as having to do with intention or purpose or it
is intended; designed; done with design or purpose; as, the act was
intentional, not accidental.f
The willful or intentional standard was difficult for complainants to prove.
Unlike other states, Texas did not favor circumstantial proof of intent."
Moreover, its well-pled complaint requirement "may well have permitted
many cases of actually willful or intentional neglect to go uninvestigated. This
problem emerge[d] because although many clients could allege that their
lawyers had in fact neglected their case, far fewer would be able to say
precisely why their lawyer had done so."38 As Professors Schuwerk and Sutton
concluded, this "willful" and "intentional" standard of the Texas Code meant
that some unprofessional conduct could go "unpunished.""
Accordingly, when the professors and the Texas State Bar drafted the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (effective 1990), they
modified both the old Code standard and the new ABA Model Rules 1.1 and
1.3. Texas Rule 1.01 combines the elements of Model Rules 1.1 and 1.3 into
one rule about "competent and diligent representation." In contrast to the ABA
Model Rules, neglect not only remains in the text of the disciplinary rule but is
identified therein. Rule 1.01 provides, in relevant part, that:
(b) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; or
36 Brown v. State Bar of Tex., 960 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added).
37 ROBERT P. SCHUWERK & LILLIAN B. HARDWICK, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS LAWYER AND JUDICIAL
ETHICS 320 (2002).
38 id.
39 Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 20, at 25.
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(2) frequently fail to carry out completely the obligations
that the lawyer owes to a client or clients.
(c) As used in this Rule, "neglect" signifies inattentiveness involving
a conscious disregard for the responsibilities owed to a client or
clients.40
With this new language and definition, the "Rule adopts a standard of
discipline between the simple neglect that might suffice in an action for
malpractice and the 'willful or intentional' standard of the former Texas Code
• . .illustrating that more than simple negligence is required. ' 4, Such neglect
could be proved by circumstantial evidence.42
By abandoning the tough Texas Code requirements, the new rule
encouraged more investigation of complaints and more discipline for lawyers.
Nonetheless, it retained some protection for lawyers by setting the disciplinary
standard higher than simple negligence, as the ABA had done in its early ethics
opinion on the Code.43 Why set a standard higher than simple neglect?
[S]ome degree of neglect unfortunately emerges as a simple fact of
professional life. Any practicing lawyer can recall some instances in
which he or she paid less attention to a legal matter than it deserved,
at least for some period of time. If all such lapses could give rise to
disciplinary action, virtually all lawyers would have black marks
against their names.44
40 TEXAS DISCIPLINARY R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.01 (1989), reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2,
subtit. G, app. (Vernon Supp. 1995) (emphasis added); see also Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 20, at 18
("Paragraph (c) has no direct counterpart in the former Texas Code, although DR 6-101(A)(3) did require that
a lawyer's neglect of a matter be willful or intentional before the lawyer could be subjected to discipline.").
As used in the rule, "neglect" means inattentiveness involving a conscious disregard for the
responsibilities owed to a client . . . . Comment 6 to Rule 1.01 explains that having accepted
employment, a lawyer should act with competence, commitment, and dedication to the interest of
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.
Eureste v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 76 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
41 TEX. YOUNG LAWYERS ASS'N, TEXAS LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL ETHICS: A PROJECr OF THE TEXAS
YOUNG LAWYERS ASS'N 1-8 to 1-9 (3rd ed. 1997) (emphasis added). See also SCHUWERK & HARDWICK,
supra note 37, at 321 ("[l1n formulating Rule 1.01, the drafting committee consciously established a standard
of discipline between the simple neglect that might suffice in an action for malpractice and the 'willful or
intentional' standard of the former Texas Code ... illustrating that more than simple negligence is involved.").
42 SCHUWERK & HARDWICK, supra note 37, at 322.
43 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
44 Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 20, at 25. See also SCHUWERK & HARDWICK, supra note 37, at 320;
TEx. YOUNG LAWYERS ASS'N, supra note 41, at 1-8, which states:
[Vol. 52
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Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.01 contains a comment about procrastination
with the same opening sentences to Model Rule 1.3's comment 2." It adds
more details, however, about what constitutes neglect. For example, it clarifies
that because of the wording of paragraph (b) lawyers may be disciplined for
either a pattern or single instance of neglect.
Under paragraph (b), a lawyer is subject to professional discipline for
neglecting a particular legal matter as well as for frequent failures to
carry out fully the obligations owed to one or more clients. A lawyer
who acts in good faith is not subject to discipline, under those
provisions for an isolated, inadvertent, or unskilled act or omission,
tactical error, or error of judgment.46
A pattern of inattentiveness toward many clients constitutes neglect, even
though the lawyer did not act in conscious disregard of a client's well-being.
41
One of the reasons that Texas opted for its combination
diligence/competence rule, with its specific standards, instead of the ABA
Rules, was to avoid "blur[ring], if not eradicat[ing], the traditional distinction
between lawyer behavior meriting disciplinary sanctions and lawyer behavior
exposing the lawyer to civil liability for malpractice., 48 Part III examines this
relationship between neglect and negligence.
III. NEGLIGENCE V. NEGLECT
Throughout the development of the neglect standards explained in Part II,
the commentators and rulemakers have emphasized the distinction between
neglect and negligence. Nonetheless, "[n]eglect and negligence are frequently
confused and important distinctions between them overlooked.... Negligence
is a tort arising from a breach of duty owed to a client. Malpractice is a species
of negligence. . . . Neglect, on the other hand, is a breach of an ethical
The neglect of legal matters by the lawyers to whom they have been entrusted is one of the most
widely condemned failures of our profession. Although serious neglect of legal matters is
justifiably condemned, some degree of neglect unfortunately emerges on occasion as a fact of
professional life for virtually every lawyer. Consequently, it is necessary to decide what degree of
neglect should suffice to subject a lawyer to discipline.
45 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
46 TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.01 cmt. 7 (1989), reprinted in TEXAS GOv'T CODE ANN.,
tit. 2, subtit. G, app. (Vernon Supp. 1995).
47 SCHUWERK & HARDWICK, supra note 37, at 323.
48 Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 20, at 19.
20031
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standard imposed upon the entire profession., 49  The confusion between the
two concepts makes it difficult for disciplinary committees to identify and
punish neglect.5 °  Moreover, the disciplinary rules, with their "duties of
diligence, promptness, and competence are all encompassed within the bundle
of duties to clients that are most commonly enforced through legal malpractice
actions rather than through lawyer discipline."'"
In states like Texas, it can be harder to prove incompetence than
negligence; Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.01 requires something more than
"simple negligence. 52 Sometimes neglect requires a pattern of behavior and
negligence only a single instance of misconduct. At other times it may be
easier to prove neglect than negligence. For example, discipline for neglect
does not require harm to clients. 3
Judgments about neglect are similar to negligence because they are fact-
specific. The fact situations of neglect cases are repetitive. They include
"failure to commence an action, appear at a hearing, respond to discovery, or
respond to correspondence from opposing counsel and the court. 54  Neglect
"may mean abandoning a contract for services, missing a deadline, or
negligently failing to assert a claim. Neglect also encompasses the failure to
49 Dana D. Peck & James J. Coffey, Unhappy Clients May Lodge Complaints of Neglect Even when
Malpractice Is not an Issue, 71 N.Y. ST. B.J. 47, 47 (1999).
50 See, e.g., RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROLE LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 49 (2002)
("Even cases which discipline lawyers purely on competence grounds recognize the difficulty in applying what
many see more as a negligence standard.").
51 HAZARD& HODES, supra note 11, at 6-3.
52 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Past cases that have resulted in the imposition of public sanctions by the South Carolina
Supreme Court have not involved mere negligence. All lawyers make mistakes, but these mistakes
are seldom the sole basis for grievance proceedings. The court sanctions patterns of continued
neglect and incompetence or neglect plus additional misconduct.
These cases demonstrate that the court is very aware of the distinctive purpose of the
grievance process. Normal acts of negligence and normal mistakes do not result in disciplinary
sanctions. Only when they are combined with fraudulent or unethical conduct or a continued and
repeated pattern will the court invoke its sanctioning authority. Representative cases exemplify the
notion that more grievous instances of neglect, especially when coupled with other misconduct,
warrant at least a public reprimand.
Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., Negligence or Neglect-Mistake or Grievance: Lawyer Conduct and the Limits of
the Grievance Process, 42 S.C. L. REV. 943,953 (1991).
53 See Peck & Coffey, supra note 49, at 47 ("Neglect, therefore, usually involves more than a single act
or omission, while negligence may arise from a solitary significant error in judgment. In addition, a charge of
neglect, unlike negligence, does not require a showing of actual harm to the client.").
54 Schuwerk & Sutton, supra note 20, at 24.
[Vol. 52
HeinOnline  -- 52 Emory L.J. 1098 2003
A CLIENTS' THEORY OF PROFESSIONALISM
appear at a proceeding, failure to prepare a necessary document, or failure to
carry out administrative duties in probate or bankruptcy proceedings."" Or,
there is the "recurring scenario" (as in the Louisiana Bar) of attorneys
accepting money for work and then pretending they have earned their fee:
Collectively, these [neglect] cases and others suggest a recurring
scenario that is growing disturbingly familiar: An attorney accepts,
for a small advance, a case which will require a substantial amount of
work; the attorney does not make clear exactly how much work will
be done for the advanced amount; the client, however, expects that a
substantial amount will be done toward solving the problem before
more money is due, or expects that the remainder of the attorney's
fee will be paid out of his recovery; the attorney does nothing more,
keeps the advance, and, if questioned, takes the position that he or
she earned the fee in the first interview or with the initial research 6
When disciplinary agencies assess these recurring situations of neglect,
they usually weigh the following factors: length of the delay, urgency of the
legal matter, complexity of the legal matter, harm to the client, and harm to the
profession. 7  The grievance committees also apply mitigating factors,
including personal characteristics (good reputation and candor) and
explanations of the lawyer's conduct (personal or family crises, illness)."
The disciplinary system of the State Bar of Texas includes seventeen
disciplinary districts, each of which has at least one Grievance Committee
comprised of practicing attorneys and members of the public. These
committees investigate complaints, hear cases, and punish practicing attorneys
for any violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules. These committees change
membership every several years. Punishments administered by the grievance
committees include private reprimands, required participation in rehabilitation
programs, public reprimands, probation, suspension, and disbarment. Texas
55 Carpenter, supra note 52, at 952.
56 La. State Bar Ass'n v. Williams, 549 So. 2d 275, 277-78 (La. 1989). See also Hunt v. Disciplinary Bd.
of the Ala. State Bar in which the court found:
The law governing the lawyer-client relationship may be stated, in the context of the instant
case and Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A), Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows: Whenever a
person consults a lawyer, advising him of the facts concerning a legal claim, and the lawyer agrees
to "take the case," and thereafter assures such person that he is handling the case and that it will be
heard at a future date, a lawyer-client relationship is established; and the lawyer is guilty of
wilfully [sic] neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him if he takes no action on client's behalf.
381 So. 2d 52, 53-54 (Ala. 1980).
57 Peck & Coffey, supra note 49, at 47-49.
51 id. at 49.
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law requires that the bar maintain a "complaint tracking system" of grievances
against Texas lawyers. 9
As in other jurisdictions, in Texas neglect is the most frequent complaint
against lawyers.60 Although some complaints involve neglect alone, often
neglect accompanies other violations of the disciplinary rules.6' Hence it is
difficult to quantify what discipline is assessed for neglect alone.6 Moreover,
the cases are fact-specific, and punishment is determined on a case-by-case
63basis. Thus it is difficult to discern a pattern to the penalties that are imposed.
Finally, there is (and can be) no comparative study of how discipline for
59 Under VTCA Government Code § 81.072(b)(5), the State Bar of Texas is required to maintain a
complaint tracking system for lawyers. According to Constance Miller, Program Director for the Client
Attorney Assistance Program of the State Bar of Texas, the grievance process and tracking system work in the
following manner:
Any grievance reported through the "hotline" is gathered and recorded. However, the
process does not become formal until a written complaint is filed. When the written complaint is
filed, it is forwarded to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (OCD) [sic]. See Rule of Procedure
2.09. The OCD has a database tracking system, which can identify all complaints against any
attorney. The database also notes when the investigation was conducted, whether the complaint
was dismissed (i.e. did not fall within the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure), or whether a
legitimate complaint was found. If a legitimate complaint was found, a Just Cause Hearing is set
up, & the attorney is served with a copy of the complaint. The database also tracks all of this
information.
Note that the grievance process is confidential until a finding of just cause is found and the
disciplinary action taken is a public reprimand or greater (Rule 2.15 of the Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure). It is only after these requirements that information on the entire
grievance process (including what was "tracked" in the database) for a particular case may be
obtained.
E-Mail Memorandum from Loreley Ramirez, University of Houston Research Assistant to author, Complaint
Tracking System (April 4, 2003) (on file with author).
60 See chart, "State Bar of Texas Attorney Grievance System," provided to author by Constance J. Miller,
Program Director, Client-Attorney Assistance Program, State Bar of Texas, in letter of 4/4/03 to UH Faculty
Service Librarian Harriet Richman (identifying the following numbers of neglect violations from 1994-2002:
01-02, 1,788; 00-01, 1,749; 99-00, 1,911; 98-99, 2,429; 97-98, 2,310; 96-97, 2,408; 95-96, 2,614; 94-95,
2,590). The next-highest violations-safeguarding property and declining or terminating representation-
occur much less frequently-only up to a high of 766 complaints about declining representation in 1994-1995.
61 See E-Mail Memorandum from Lorely Ramirez, University of Houston research assistant to author
(April 9, 2003) (on file with author) (Mark Pinckard, from the Texas Office of Disciplinary Counsel, said that
"the State Bar did not have a tracking system identifying which complaints about neglect led to disciplinary
actions or how many were dismissed. He said that often the grievance will start off as neglect & later evidence
will come up that there was another violation, and there was no tracking system to record when this
happened.").
62 Id.
63 This conclusion is based on information and materials provided by Texas bar counsel Mark Pinckard
to University of Houston law student, Carla Bey.
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neglect fared under the old Code and the new Rules; the "old statistics were
done by hand" and are inaccessible. 4 Although neglect is clients' primary
complaint about lawyers, the effects and effectiveness of their grievances
remain uncertain, an undesirable result under a clients' theory of
professionalism.
IV. CLIENTS' CONCLUSION FOR STRICT LIABILITY?
Although the lawyers' standards have changed and developed, the clients'
complaints remain constant; lawyers neglect their clients' affairs. From the
perspective of the lawyer, neglect requires more than simple negligence.
Otherwise, lawyers would be penalized for every mistake.
In contrast, clients could tolerate a disciplinary standard that permits some
sanction of lawyers for neglect-style mistakes. For example, in Texas, the
"many types of negligence claims against lawyers" include the following
mistakes:
Statute of limitations/timely filing error, error in drafting transaction
documents, failure to present required notification on a note
acceleration, failure to present timely administrative claims, failure to
present timely claims to estate administrators, failure to prosecute or
delay in prosecuting claims, delay in preparing closing documents,
failure to file an appearance or answer, failure to raise defenses, and
failure to investigate."
Without an intent or conscious disregard or more-than-negligence requirement,
disciplinary agencies could easily penalize lawyers for such occurrences. Late
is late; unfiled is unfiled; absent is absent.
As in current case law, there would be no sanction if "there is no evidence
in the record to suggest that Rule 1.01 was violated." 66 The punishment need
not be harsh; it could be an admonitory letter or a system of points listed on
one's record. Serious penalties like disbarment would arise only (as they do
64 In response to author's query, "Do they have pre-1990 numbers on neglect allegations that we could
see?" Mark Pinckard "said that before 1993 all statistics were done by hand, & he is not sure what happened to
them & didn't have a way of accessing them." Id.
65 CHARLES F. HERRING, JR., TEXAS LEGAL MALPRACTICE & LAWYER DISCIPLINE 30-39 (3d ed. 2002).
66 Brown v. State Bar of Texas, 960 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Tx. Ct. App. 1997).
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now) when "a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client
matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.' 67
In the area of neglect, the real question is not to identify what clients want,
but whether the bar will give them what they want, i.e., a disciplinary system
that effectively sanctions lawyers for their neglect of clients' matters.
67 Colorado v. Wyman, 782 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1989) (quoting Section 4.41 of the ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986)).
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